The Reality of Contract in English Law by Samuel, Geoffrey
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 13 Issue 3 
1978 
The Reality of Contract in English Law 
Geoffrey Samuel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Geoffrey Samuel, The Reality of Contract in English Law, 13 Tulsa L. J. 508 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol13/iss3/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please 
contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
ESSAY
THE REALITY OF CONTRACT IN ENGLISH
LAW
Geoffrey Samuel*t
One of the great similarities between English and Roman law is
said to lie in the fact that both systems concerned themselves with rem-
edies rather than rights. In Roman law this emphasis is perhaps re-
flected in the lack of concern for a general law of contract; for the
common lawyer, the emphasis is reflected in the lack of a general the-
ory of tort. This is not to say that each system did not develop any
general principles: the Roman concept of bona fides' is perhaps one of
the great legacies of their law of obligations, and Donoghue v.
Stevenson2 undoubtedly represents a rallying point for the common law
in respect of personal injuries.3 However, both systems being keen to
develop their law through the decision or discussion of concrete factual
situations, there is in both a concern with the nature of the plaintifi's
claim, rather than-as with many modern civil law systems-a preoc-
cupation with notions of fights and duties. Thus to emphasize English
law's general theory of contract is perhaps to conceal the varying na-
ture of possible claims in a contract action.
Accordingly, it will be the aim of this essay to examine some lead-
ing contract cases from the angle of the nature of the plaintiff's claim,
* Lecturer in Law, University of Keele, Staffordshire, England; M.A., LL.B. (Cantab.),
Cambridge University (Pembroke College), England.
t The author expresses thanks to Tony Weir of Cambridge University (Trinity College),
England, for his helpful comments.
1. F. KESSLER AND G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1970) [here-
inafter cited as KESSLER & GILMORE]; POWELL, Good Faith in Contracts, 9 CURRENT LEOAL
PROB. 16 (1956).
2. [1932] A.C. 562.
3. Id.; see also Read v. J. Lyons & Co. [1947] A.C. 156.
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CONTRACT IN ENGLISH LAW
as opposed to the traditional standpoint of contract as a promissory
obligation. In this way certain historical-but, hopefully, still more
than relevant-preoccupations of the common law may become evi-
dent. Also by highlighting focal points that form the substance of what
we would today call contractual actions, it may be possible to identify
certain dialectical tensions between form and facts long thought to
have been confined to the grave with the demise of the forms of action.
Furthermore, by investigating the substance of a plaintiffs complaint it
may be possible to expose the foundations of contract (and tort) liabil-
ity which, unlike those of Mr. Anns' house,4 may prove to have more
depth and cohesion than many post-laissez-faire judicial architects give
credit.
I. ROGUE MALE
Having advertised their Renault Dauphine for sale, the Ingram
sisters were visited one Saturday in August, 1957 by a talkative gentle-
man caller who claimed to live in Surrey but have family connections
in Cornwall. He expressed great interest in the car and gave his name
as Mr. Hutchinson. After a vociferous test drive, the sisters agreed to
sell the vehicle for £717; however they became distinctly icy when the
visitor produced his cheque-book. In order to placate them, the man
announced that he was in fact the Mr. P.G.W. Hutchinson of Stanstead
House, Caterham-a gentleman with important business interests in
Guildford. Discovering from a telephone directory that such a charac-
ter existed, the sisters accepted his cheque and handed over the Re-
nault; unfortunately the visitor was not the gentleman of substance he
claimed to be and by the time the sisters discovered this fact, 'Hutchin-
son'--or 'Hardy' as he subsequently called himself-had disposed of
the car to a bona fide purchaser, Mr. Little.
The sisters traced the Renault to Mr. Little's possession and sued
him in detinue and conversion for its return or value. The trial judge
and majority of the court of appeal allowed the sisters to proceed, ex-
pressing due sympathy to the unfortunate Mr. Little by way of compen-
sation. The reasoning of the majority was centered on the contract
between the Ingram sisters and 'Hutchinson'; if a valid agreement had
been concluded then title would pass to the rogue and in turn he could
give title to Little. If, however, because of a fundamental mistake of
identity, a contract had not been concluded, then no title could pass
4. See Anns v. London Borough of Merton [1977] 2 All E.R. 492 (H.L.) (the latest negli-
gence case that seems to be doing the work of contract).
19781
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and the swindler would not be able to furnish Little with good title
under the principle of nemo dat quod non habet. Accordingly the
judges, no doubt on counsels' advice, preoccupied themselves with the
conceptual wrangles about mistake of identity in the law of contract.
It is not surprising, therefore, to find that English lawyers usually
treat Ingram v. Little5 as a contract case. It appears in the law reports
and textbooks under the heading of mistake or offer and acceptance;
and the Law Reform Committee6 seemed little interested in question-
ing this analysis other than to recommend that the contract between the
Ingram sisters and the rogue should have been voidable rather than
void. A point now accepted-if it had not already been so-by the
common law.7
However such an analysis would surprise a Roman lawyer. His
attention would be focused not on the relationship between the In-
grams and the rogue, but on the connection between the sisters and the
car. To the Roman lawyer the case would be one of property rather
than contract. Unfortunately when the common lawyer thinks of prop-
erty it conjures up a feudal image of land-and all its legal en-
tails-with little thought given to chattels, which tend to be relegated to
other divisions of our legal system such as tort, sale of goods and hire-
purchase. The key to the Roman lawyer's understanding of Ingram v.
Little would be the plaintiff's actual claim, which was of course tort,
namely conversion and detinue. And these actions are not really obli-
gation remedies at all-a point emphasized by the fact that damages
are measured by the value of the chattels, behaviour being irrele-
vant--they are much closer to the old Roman proprietary action of
vindcatio.9
The failure to appreciate Ingram v. Little as a property case can
have practical, as well as academic, repercussions. Very little, if any,
attention was paid by the judges to the law regarding the passing of
property in chattels; it was assumed that the conveyance stood or fell
with the contract. But if contract is vital to the property position, how
can title to goods pass under any defective contract? Yet the Privy
5. [1961] 1 Q.B. 31.
6. LAW REFORM COMMITTEE, TWELFTH REPORT:. TRANSFER OF TITLE TO CHATTELS (Cmd.
2958) (1966).
7. Lewis v. Averay [1972] 1 Q.B. 198. See also King's Norton Metal Co. v. Eldridge, Merrett
& Co. [1897] 14 T.L.R. 98; Phillips v. Brooks Ltd. [1919] 2 K.B. 243.
8. T. WEIR, A CASEBOOK ON TORT 393-98 (3d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as WEIR].
9. See B. NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 99-103 (1962).
['Vol. 13:508
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Council in Singh v. Alli ° had little doubt that it could. Perhaps a con-
tract that has never been made is different from one that is defective
only through illegality; a pity, though, that Singh v. Al[-with its sug-
gestion that property can pass by delivery and intention-was not cited
in Ingram v. Little. Much trouble and distress might have been spared
to Mr. Averay if it had been."
It should be evident now that the Ingram sisters' claim against Mr.
Little was not itself a contractual claim; they were seeking, not damages
for breach of promise, but the return of what they considered to be
their property. Looked at from the plaintiff's point of view these iden-
tity cases themselves take on a new identity-from contract to realty.' 2
II. ESCAPE IN VAIN
Chattels are not the only items of property to which a plaintiff may
lay claim; common lawyers have long recognized that a debt can give
rise to a similar cause of action.' 3 Thus the old writ of debt was not at
all unlike detinue; indeed, the two were originally the same.' 4
An advertisement in the Pall Mall Gazette on November 13, 1891,
stipulated that the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company would pay £100 by
way of reward to any person who contracted influenza after having
used the company's inhalent three times daily for two weeks as per
directions supplied. To indicate that this was no mere advertisement,
the advertisement went on to state " £1000 is deposited with the Alli-
ance Bank, Regent Street, showing our sincerity in the matter.'-, Mrs.
Carlill, believing both the health and the sincerity assurances,
purchased one of the inhalents and used it as directed for the two
weeks; the product proved ineffective and the company insincere. Haw-
kins, J. allowed Mrs. Carlill to recover the £100; an appeal by the com-
pany proved as ill-fated as their Smoke Ball.
It might be useful at this point to compare the plaintiffs claim in
10. [1960] A.C. 167. But c( Higgins, The Transfer of Property Under Illegal Transactions, 25
MOD. L. REV. 149 (1962).
11. Lewis v. Averay [1972] 1 Q.B. 198. Note that in this case Singh v. Ali, [1960] A.C. 167, was
again not discussed. Indeed, the court of appeal once more restricted itself to a discussion of
mistake of identity in contract. There was no discussion of the property aspects.
12. The use of "realty" here is in the Roman sense, meaning property in general, including
chattels.
13. For a discussion of the history and modem survival of debt, see Levontin, Debt and Con-
tract in the Common Law, 1 ISRAEL L. REV. 60 (1966).
14. A. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE RISE OF THE ACTION
OF ASSuMPIsT 57, 75 (1975) [hereinafter cited as SIMPSON].
15. Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. [1893] 1 Q.B. 256.
1978]
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Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co.16 with that of Mr. Hobbs in Hobbs v.
London and South Western Railway Co.'7 The plaintiff, together with
his wife and two young children, purchased tickets for the midnight
train to Hampton Court; unfortunately the train wrongfully went to
Esher instead. Because of the traditional British dearth of transport fa-
cilities after the midnight hour, the family was forced to walk the five
miles home in the drizzling rain; the experience was so miserable that
Mrs. Hobbs was laid up for much time with an illness not dissimilar to
that experienced by Mrs. Carlill. Mr. Hobbs sued the railway company
for breach of contract and succeeded, being awarded £8 for the incon-
venience and £20 for his wife's illness and its consequences. On appeal
to the Queen's Bench, the court held that the £8 was properly awarded,
but the £20 was not-that damage was not to be contemplated by the
railway company and, as such, they could not be said, in law, to be the
cause of it.
Both Carlill and Hobbs are traditionally analyzed as contract
cases; the plaintiffs were entitled to damages for breach of the defend-
ants' promise. However it soon becomes obvious that the nature of the
claims in the two cases are very different. The remedy sought by the
plaintiff in Carlillwas not unlike that of the Ingram sisters; both could
be said to be claiming specific items of property. In Ingram v. Little it
was the car or its value; in Carlillit was £100, no more no less. These
claims are very different from the action for compensation in Hobb,
here the plaintiff was seeking damages for a loss arising out of the de-
fendants' wrongdoing. In this kind of claim, as has been seen, the court
will pay particular attention to the actual losses and their causes. The
difference between the 'proprietary' actions and a damages claim can
be found in history where, as Milsom points out, two simple ideas were
at work--"the demand for a right and the complaint of a wrong."18
Debt and detinue-along with trespass-were old writs whose primary
function was to protect property and personal rights; the preoccupation
with compensation came with the rise of actions on the case in the four-
teenth and fifteenth centuries.' 9 Broadly, then, the difference between a
writ action and action on the case was that in "the latter damage was
the gist of the action, in the former it was not." 0 Thus it could be said
16. Id.
17. [1875] L.R. 10 Q.B. 111.
18. S. MiLsoN, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 211 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as MILSOM].
19. For an excellent discussion, see Id, ch. 11.
20. F. LAWSON, REMEDIES OF ENGLISH LAW 82 (1975) [hereinafter cited as LAWSON].
[Vol. 13:508
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that the difference between the claims of Mrs. Carlill and Mr. Hobbs is
that the former was founded in the writ of debt21-and thus the actual
loss suffered by her was irrelevant-while the latter was founded in
case.
The modem analysis of Carlill and Hobbs still admits of some
difference between them. The former case is termed a unilateral con-
tract, while the latter is referred to as bilateral; the practical difference
between the two is that "a unilateral contract of itself never gives rise to
any obligation on the promise to do or to refrain from doing any-
thing."22However, despite this contemporary example of analytical dis-
tinction, both cases are still seen today as compensation actions for
breach of promise; the problem of relating Mrs. Carlill's £100 to her
actual loss is overcome by applying a rule of damages that a plaintiff in
a contractual action is entitled to an expectation interest. In the words
of Baron Parke: "The rule of the common law is, that where a party
sustains a loss by reason of a breach of contract, he is, so far as money
can do it, to be placed in the same situation, with respect to damages, as
if the contract had been performed. 23 Of course, the promise that is of
importance in Carlillis the one for the £100 reward; the court of appeal
was not awarding damages for breach of the undertaking that users of
the smoke ball would not catch the flu (the defendants never promised
that anyway). If the case had been based on breach of a promise of that
nature (assuming of course that the advertisement was differently
worded), then Mrs. Carlill would only have been entitled to her actual
loss arising from being ill. In fact, such a claim might prove very
beneficial to a consumer who has relied to his detriment upon specific
advertising statements made by a commercial enterprise.24
Promises, therefore, can relate either to specific items of property
or money or to warranties as to goods or services. And it is the fact that
many transactions can be loosely analysed into promises that allowed
King's Bench to subsume the old writ of debt within the rubric of tres-
pass on the case at the beginning of the seventeenth century.25 In a
21. Levontin, supra note 13, at 86.
22. Per Diplock, L.J. in U.D.T. (Commercial) Ltd. v. Eagle Aircraft Services Ltd. [1968] 1 All
E.R. 104, 109.
23. Robson v. Harman [1848] 154 E.R. 363, 365.
24. See Shankiin Pier Ltd. v. Detel Products Ltd. [1951] 2 K.B. 854; Wells (Merstham) Ltd. v.
Buckland Sand & Silica Ltd. [1964] 1 All E.R. 41.
25. Slade's Case [1602] 2 Rep. 91; 76 E.R. 1072; MILSoM, supra note 18, at 292-308; Simpson,
The Place of Slade's Case in the History of Contract, 74 L.Q. REY. 381 (1958); Lucke, Slade's Case
and the Origin of the Common Courts, 81 L.Q. REv. 422, 539 (1965); 82 L.Q. REV. 81.
1978]
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sense Slade's Case26-- with its common denominator of prom-
ise-could be said to be the 'Donoghue v. Stevenson' of contract; and at
this level of abstraction it is easy to make the transition from realty to
obligation, as Carlill in fact shows.
The historical difference between unilateral and bilateral contracts
is a difference between formality and consensuality. In understanding
the concept of contract (in both English and Roman law) it is very nec-
essary to see the part played by each. In English law, debt was a
recupatory action whose binding nature lay in its form; consent and
agreement were of little relevance." And quidpro quo was not so much
evidence of agreement as evidence of a proprietary transaction. 8 With
the rise of case, however, there was a shift in emphasis from formality
to substance: questions of cu/pa, consensuality and so on, became of
essence-and these were related directly to the plaintiff's actual dam-
age. Thus, with the formal writs, the questions asked tended to be very
mechanistic: Has the defendant directly invaded the plaintiff's person
or property? Is the defendant detaining the plaintiff's money or prop-
erty? On the other hand, with case, the question was more often
whether the plaintiff should have a remedy for this particular dam-
age?2 9 And this latter question would involve a consideration of several
focal points: for example, the behavior of the parties, their relationship,
causation, the type of damage, and so on and so forth. It was in case
that the real law of obligations was forged; property and debt belong
more properly to the formal writ system-although, of course, this is a
much simplified picture. Broadly then, it might be true to say that as
many of the classical unilateral contracts are debt cases, unilateral con-
tracts reflect the old formalised writ system; while bilateral contracts
are a result of case. A similar pattern can be found in Roman law,
although Buckland and McNair point out: "As no general doctrine of
consideration ever appeared it is not surprising that the formal unilat-
26. Slade's Case [1602] 2 Rep. 91; 76 E.R. 1072. Of course, Slade's Casemust be treated with
a certain caution. See Baker, New Light on Slade's Case, CAMBRIDGE L.J. 51, 213 (1971). How-
ever, it is submitted that the decision nevertheless represents a useful local point for the judicial
thinking of the time, even if the Chief Justice "Coked the books, so to speak. . . ." See A. SIMP-
SON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT (1975) (reviewed by Duncanson in 39
MOD. L. REv. 741, 742 (1976)).
27. W. BUCKLAND & A. McNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW 274 (2d ed. 1965) [here-
inafter cited as BUCKLAND & McNAIR] see SIMPSON, supra note 14, at 186-87.
28. For a discussion of the relationship between the old notion of quidpro quo and the more
modem idea of consideration, see SIMPSON, supra note 14, at 424. See also MILSOM, supra note 18,
at 293.
29. See Winfield, The Foundation of Liability in Tort, 27 COLUM. L. REv. I (1927).
[Vol. 13:508
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eral contract is more prominent [in Roman law] than it is with us."30
It would be tempting to think that the problems of form and sub-
stance would-indeed, should-have disappeared with the demise of
the forms of action. Unfortunately it is not so easy to bury five hundred
years of legal introspection; at least, not without considerable murmur-
ings from beyond the grave. In fact, it is this century that is bearing the
brunt of judicial chain-rattling; and, while it is tort31 that seems, osten-
sibly, to be the grand Haunted Palace, contract can still find itself faced
with historical spectres. White and Carter (Councils) Ltd v. McGregor 2
is a case in point.
In McGregor, the plaintiffs were a firm of advertisers who received
a telephone order from the defendants' manager to place advertise-
ments of the defendants' business on local authority litter bins for a
period of three years. The manager, it seems, had exceeded his man-
date and the defendants subsequently wrote to the plaintiffs purporting
to cancel the agreement. The plaintiffs, however, refused to accept the
cancellation, went ahead with the advertising, and then sued for the
contract price. A majority of the House of Lords allowed the plaintiffs
to recover the debt, despite the defendants' argument that the plaintiffs
ought to have mitigated their loss. "If one party to a contract repudiates
it," said Lord Reid, "the other party. . . has an option. He may accept
that repudiation and sue for damages for breach of contract. . . or he
may if he chooses disregard or refuse to accept it and then the contract
remains in full effect."33
The House of Lords, by allowing the plaintiffs to recover the full
contract price, were in effect paying no attention to the actual damage
suffered by them; the issue was whether or not they should have 'their'
money. Once again, the case was not really a damage action in the true
sense, but an action for debt; and it was this difference of remedy that
formulated the whole basis of the dispute before their lordships. From
an historical point of view, the plaintiff was claiming in debt while the
defendant was arguing that the action should be in case; only in the
latter claim would mitigation-being a rule of damages-be relevant.
McGregor comes very close to the kind of procedural dispute that
would "gratify the ghosts of generations of special pleaders. ' '34
30. BUCKLAND & McNAIR, supra note 27, at 275.
31. See National Coal Board v. Evans [1951] 2 K.C. 861; Fowler v. Lanning [1959] 1 Q.B.
426; Letang v. Cooper [1965] 1 Q.B. 232.
32. [1962] A.C. 413.
33. Id. at 427.
34. To use the words of Diplock in Fowler v. Lanning, [1959] 1 Q.B. 426, 431.
1978]
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III. HAVOC BY ACCIDENT
The original writ of trespass was an action protecting a person
from direct physical invasion of his person or property. In the techno-
logically unsophisticated society of medieval Britain, a good many in-
vasions were of a direct physical nature and so the action worked
tolerably well for a while.35 Nevertheless, the original writ had serious
defects that were soon to become apparent as society developed-the
injury had to be direct and little attention was paid to the plaintiffs
actual damage. Rights, it seems, were more important than remedies.
However, once trespass was freed from the limitations of directness, by
the action on the case,3 6 the idea soon developed that one could not
only invade by physical means, but also by words; the tongue being as
mighty as the sword. It is not surprising to find, therefore, that traders
who lied about their goods were as much wrongdoers as militant
sword-rattlers. 37 As Milsom points out, "Consumer protection is
neither a modem invention nor an exclusively modem need. '38 Law
and economics were good partners.
Speech, however, is civilization itself. And so the problem arose as
to which statements ought to attract the attention of the law. If the
words complained of had been accompanied by an act whereby the
plaintiff suffered his loss, then there was less of a problem. Thus, case
remedies were soon available, for example, against the surgeon who
said he would cure the plaintiffs horse, but who went about it so care-
lessly as to achieve the opposite result.39 The real difficulty was with the
defendant who said he would do something but did nothing; his state-
ment was accompanied by a nonfeasance rather than with a misfea-
sance, and here the law was faced with the old maxim 'Not doing is no
trespass'.40Nevertheless, the judiciary was able to overcome its fears of
the metaphorical floodgates by accepting the theory that if the defend-
ant did not do what he said he would do, this was tantamount to de-
ceit.4 ' Thus trespass on the case was gradually extended to where it
35. WEIR, supra note 8, at 253.
36. Dix, The Origins of theAction of Trespass as the Case, 46 YALE L.J. 1142 (1937); MILSOM,
supra note 18, at 256-61; Plucknett, Case and the Statute of Westminster II, 31 COLUM. L. REV.
778 (1931); A. KiRALFY, THE ACTION AS THE CASE (1951); Prichard, Trespass, Case and the Rule
in Williams v. Holland, 1964 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 234.
37. Milsom, Sale of Goods in the Ffteenth Century, 1961 L.Q. REv. 257, 278-82.
38. MiLSOM, supra note 18, at 276.
39. Waldon v. Marshall, Y.B. Mich. 43 Edw. 3 (1370); see C. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES
OF THE COMMON LAW 81 (1949).
40. See Milsom, Not Doing is No Trespass, 1954 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 105.
41. See KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 1, at 27.
[Vol. 13:508
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could be shown that the defendant had undertaken to do something for
a plaintiff who in turn had reasonably relied upon this statement of
intention, and had suffered damage when the defendant failed to keep
his word. This particular action became known as assumpsit: and-as
is well known-it is this remedy that paved the way for a general law of
contract, as well as giving rise to the modern idea of a bilateral obliga-
tion.42
Nevertheless, assumpsit's close association with what today we
should call tort ought not to pass unnoticed. The main difference be-
tween trespass as a tort and trespass as assumpsit was in the focal point
of liability: with the former it was the invasion that was of importance,
with the latter it was the failure to act in breach of an undertaking. In
assumpsit, the real complaint was that the plaintiff relied to his detri-
ment upon the defendant's word; the wrong was not so much the actual
invasion but the false statement by the promisor. It should come as no
surprise, therefore, to find that assumpsit was originally closely as-
sociated with what is now the tort of deceit;43 and this association can
still find itself reflected in contemporary cases, often causing difficul-
ties. 44
It was not a great step to move from the notion of undertaking and
reliance to the concept of promissory obligation. And such a conceptual
analysis was convenient for the laissez-faire-ists who wanted a stable
nucleus for commercial law as society had moved from static feudalism
to mobile capitalism. 45 The bilateral obligation, in effect, became the
means of private legislation that the industrialists needed as an anchor.
Law and economics were still good partners.
Nevertheless, the difference in emphasis, between the old idea of
invasions on the one hand and promissory undertakings or obligations,
on the other, can still cause difficulties. In Harbutt's "Plasticine' Ltd v.
Wayne Tank & Pump Co.46 the plaintiff's complaint was that the de-
fendants had wrongfully caused the destruction of their factory. The
defendants had undertaken to install on the plaintiffs' premises special-
ized equipment for storing molten stearine; the contract specified that
plastic 'Durapipe' was to be used. The work was duly completed and
42. See generally SIMPSON, supra note 14, at 250; KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 1, at 28.
43. See MILSOM, supra note 18, at 282.
44. See e.g. Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. [1964] A.C. 465. (Is this a contract,
deceit or negligence case?)
45. See generally F. LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAW 100 (1950);
KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 1, at 1-15.
46. [1970] 1 Q.B. 447; [1970] 1 All E.R. 225.
1978]
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switched on for overnight testing; unfortunately, because the pipes were
of durapipe-which was in fact unsuitable-the thermostat did not
work and all of the plaintiffs' industrial premises were consumed in the
ensuing fire. The plaintiffs, or at least their insurers, claimed from the
defendants the cost of a new factory, together with consequential loss
of profits, on the ground that the defendants were the cause of their loss
in that they had impliedly promised that care would be taken in respect
of the materials specified in the contract and used in the construction of
the installation. This claim was successful despite a clause in the con-
tract which purported to limit the defendants' liability to the amount of
the contract price.47
Difficulties arise if this case is approached from the classical con-
tract point of view, for this view emphasises the promise(s) rather than
the invasion. Thus the defendants never undertook to make good all
loss arising as a result of their negligence; they only agreed (via the
limitation clause) to compensate up to a certain figure. In effect, the
defendants were putting up an argument that given the damage in is-
sue, which fell within the limitation clause, they should only be liable
for the contract price, for that is all they promised; their argument was,
in one sense, Carlill in reverse.
If, however, Wayne Tank is approached from the old trespass (or
invasion) point of view, the court of appeal's analysis makes more
sense: the defendants' wrong had invaded the plaintiffs' property and
so the former, it could be said, ought to pay for all the damage arising
as a result of this negligence incurred by the latter.48 From the histori-
cal angle, the plaintiffs were claiming damages for 'trespass', while the
defendants were arguing that they had only agreed to pay a 'debt' not
measured by the actual damage sustained, but by the contract price.
Thus, to see Wayne Tank as a contract case in many ways confuses the
issue; the judges were not interested in viewing the problem as one of
contractual interpretation, they preferred to see it as the "invasion of a
legal right". And it did not much matter if this "invasion of a legal
right" was "by breach of contract or by the commission of a tort."49 Of
course, whether the court of appeal was right in adopting this approach
47. Id. at 448 (Clause 15 of the contract which limited liability to £2,330).
48. One is reminded of Lord Salmon's recent statement: "It seems to me to be manifestly fair
that any damage caused by negligence should be borne by those responsible for the negligence
rather than by the innocent who suffer from it." Arms v. London Borough of Merton [19771 2 All
E.R. 492, 511.
49. To use Lord Diplock's words from the Albazero [1976] 3 All E.R. 129, 132.
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in 1970 is another matter."
IV. CAUSE FOR ALARM
In cases like Hobbs and Wayne Tank, the defendants did not ex-
pressly promise that they would not do what they did; such promises
were implied by the law itself. In this way the common law is able to
dress up rules of law to look as if they have been determined by the
parties themselves, thus perpetrating the notion that contract is an obli-
gation founded in the will of the contractors.5 If the courts are pre-
pared to fill in the substance of an obligation once it has been created
in abstract by the parties, it is not a great step for the courts to imply
the actual obligation itself when they feel the need arises or when they
want to give the plaintiff a remedy. This is what happened in Upton-on-
Servern Rural District Council v. Powell.52
Mr. Powell awoke one night to discover that his Dutch barn was
alight. Unable to directly summon what he believed to be the local fire
brigade because they were not on the telephone, Mr. Powell rang the
Upton police who in turn telephoned a garage that was close to the
Upton fire brigade and asked for a message to be conveyed. The bri-
gade arrived and spent much time and energy dampening the blaze.
Some six hours later, a fire officer from the Pershore fire brigade ap-
peared on the scene and informed the fire officer from Upton that it
was in fact a Pershore fire they were tackling; nevertheless the Upton
brigade battled on until daybreak, when Pershore took over. Mr. Pow-
ell's problems, however, were not extinguished with the fire, as Lord
Greene M.R. pointed out:
It so happens that, although [Mr. Powell's] farm is in the
Upton police district it is not in the Upton fire district. It is in
the Pershore fire district, and [Mr. Powell] was entitled to
have the services of the Pershore fire brigade without pay-
ment. The Upton fire brigade, on the other hand, was entitled
to go to a fire outside the area, and, if it did so, quite apart
50. See Legh-Jones & Pickering, Harbutt's "Plasticine"Ltd v. Wayne Tank & Pump Co. Ltd.:
Fundamental Breach and Exemption Clauses, Damages and Interest, 86 L.Q. REv. 513 (1970);
Legh-Jones and Pickering, Fundamental Breach: The Aftermath of Harbutt's "Plasticine, " 87 L.Q.
REv. 515 (1971); Weir, CAMBRIDGE L.J. 189 (1970). Furthermore, there was no discussion of the
right of subrogation. For comments on this point (although not about Wayne Tank), see Weir,
Subrogation and Indemnity (1973) (privately published case note on Morris v. Ford Motor Co.
[1973] 1 Q.B. 792, in Cambridge Law Library).
51. See Nicholas, Rules and Terms- Civil Law and Common Law, 48 TUL. L. REv. 946, 948
(1974).
52. [1942] 1 All E.R. 220; see KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 1, at 140.
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from its statutory rights, it could make a contract that it would
be entitled to repayment of its expenses. 3
Accordingly, the Upton fire brigade sent Mr. Powell a bill and, when
he refused to pay it, had recourse to the courts.
"The sole question here," said Lord Greene when the case went to
appeal, "is whether or not any contract was made by which the Upton
fire brigade rendered services on an impromise to pay for them made
by or on behalf of [Mr. Powell]."5 4 The court of appeal unanimously
held that there was an implied contract and that the county court judge
had been right in holding Mr. Powell liable for the cost of services ren-
dered to his barn by the Upton fire brigade.
From whatever angle one approaches Powell, it is a difficult case.
Looking at it via contract, it is unsatisfactory because there was plainly
no agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant; even the Ro-
mans-who were less individualistic about their contracts-were not
prepared to see this kind of claim as being founded on agreement.
From the traditional debt angle, the case is unsatisfactory because at no
time did the defendant promise, either expressly or impliedly, that he
would pay for the fire brigade's services; Mr. Powell, no doubt being a
good tax and rates payer, expected to receive these services free. Thus,
even from the quasi-contractual approach, it is difficult to see how he
was unjustly enriched."
Part of the problem with the Powell decision arises from the belief
that debt actions are founded only upon contractual promise. Both in
Roman and pre-nineteenth century common law it was a perfectly ac-
ceptable principle that debt actions could also arise from unjust enrich-
ment; this was recognized by Lord Mansfield in 176056 and, more
recently, by Lord Atkin in United Australia Bank v. Barclays Bank
Ltd 7 The narrow view taken of debt in the classical contract era has
led lawyers to fail to take a global view of the problem in cases such as
Powell. As previously mentioned, even if Mr. Powell's liability is seen
as being based in indebitatus assumpsit, or quasi-contract, it is still un-
satisfactory because in no way was he unjustly enriched. In fact, the
party that benefited was, of course, the Pershore fire brigade and thus it
is they who should have been liable for the debt. However, because of
53. [1942] 1 All E.R. at 220.
54. Id at 220.
55. KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 1, at 142.
56. Moses v. Macferlan [1760] 2 Burr. 1005; 97 Eng. Rep. 676; see J. WADE, RESTITUTION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 5 (2d ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as WADE].
57. [1941] A.C. 1; [1940] 4 All E.R. 20; WADE, supra note 56, at 437.
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the subjection of quasi-contract and the unjust enrichment principle
during the laissez-faire period in favor of the implied contract theory,58
the debt action, especially outside the formal promise situation, became
distorted. The plain truth of the matter then in Powell is that the wrong
person got sued-the old common law would probably have had much
less difficulty in allowing a debt action between the two fire brigades
and, hopefully, so now would the common law.5 9
Once again it is important to distinguish Powellfrom the compen-
sation cases such as Hobbs and Wayne Tank. While the amount
claimed by the plaintiff in an unjust enrichment action may not be
quantifiable in quite the same way as was Mrs. Carlil's £100, the claim
is, nevertheless, better seen as a debt action than as a damages one for
"the defendant is witholding something from the plaintiff, of which he
ought to make restitution. ' ' 60 Thus debt should be seen as arising not
only from a promise or transaction, but also from the principle of un-
just enrichment. And here, of course, the remedies formulated by the
Court of Chancery becomes central.
The relationship between contract and equity is not altogether a
happy one. The bargain theory of consideration does not seem to war-
rant the expansion of promissory estopple,61 and the development of
recission as an equitable alternative in mistake cases could be seen by
some as an undermining of the strictijuris approach to the making of
these bargains.62 The main problem, again, seems to the attitudes fos-
tered by the laissez-faire era of classical contract: broad equitable prin-
ciples were too uncertain to be of use to the industrialists interested in
using contract as a means of justified enrichment. Nevertheless, if con-
tract is to be used as a legal method of enriching oneself, any hint of
bad faith, mistake or undue influence is, as far as the equity lawyer is
concerned, going to amount to profiting at the expense of another's ig-
norance or error. 63Although, of course, much depends on the status of
the parties, landlords6" and multi-nationals65 could be seen as being
58. See Sinclair v. Broughan [1914] A.C. 398; R. GOFF & G. JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITU-
TION 5-11 (1966) [hereinafter cited as GOFF & JONES].
59. But cf. Orakpo v. Manson Invs. Ltd. [1977] 3 All E.R. 1 (House of Lords).
60. LAWSON, supra note 20, at 76.
61. See comments by Lord Hailsham in Woodhouse A.C. Israel Cocoa Ltd. v. Nigerian Pro-
duce Marketing Co. Ltd. [1972] 2 All E.R. 271, 282.
62. See Smith v. Hughes [1871] L.R. 6, Q.B. 597; Bell v. Lever Bros. [1932] A.C. 161, KESSLER
& GILMORE, supra note 1, at 733. Also see Amalgamated Inv. Co. v. Walker [1976] 3 All E.R. 509.
63. See Solle v. Butcher [1950] 1 K.B. 671.
64. Riverlate Properties Ltd. v. Paul [1974] 2 All E.R. 656.
65. Bell v. Lever Bros. [1932] A.C. 161; Amalgamated Inv. Co. v. Walker [1976] 3 All E.R.
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able to take care of themselves. Thus the increasing influence of equity
within the domain of contract is in many ways just a reflection of the
revived influence of the old Roman principle that a person ought not to
be unjustly enriched at another's expense.
V. FINAL CURTAIN
The purpose of this analysis of some contract cases has been to try
to show that such categories as 'contract' and 'tort' are of little help in
understanding the way the common law tackles factual situations. The
common law is not really a system that functions in global terms, thus
to talk, as one Lord of Appeal has recently done, about contract being
"part of the law of obligations"6 6 based upon the enforcement of
promises, is elegant, but not illuminating. If any principle can be dis-
cerned, it is that the common law has tended to look at things through
the eyes of the plaintiff. invasions of interests 67 seems more accurate a
description of the principle than obligations and duties. And this idea
of interest is closely bound up with the concept and definition of 'prop-
erty'; debt, detinue, trespass, nuisance, and so on, are as much property'
writs as 'obligation' ones. Thus, much of what we might be tempted to
call obligations could equally be classified under property rights. For
the Roman lawyers, on the other hand, the obtaining of another's prop-
erty was to be distinguished from protecting one's own, so their divi-
sion of private law into obligations and property made more sense.
Obligations signified a relationship between person and person, prop-
erty-between person and thing. The English legal system, as Ingram v.
Little shows, is not concerned with such abstract distinctions; rights and
wrongs tend to be a result of the dialectical process between proprietary
formalism and judicial activism-a process that operates at such a low
level of abstraction that interpreters must have more sympathy for 'im-
pressionism' than 'classicism'. Thus, the transgression of one's privacy
is unlikely to be seen as a wrong until we see privacy as property (a
right), then it becomes a 'thing' to be invaded. Translate an English-
man's interest into a 'house' and the judges may treat it as a 'castle'.
Accordingly, it might be more helpful if the common lawyer clas-
sified civil remedies with reference not only to the nature of the wrong
(negligence, breach of promise etc.) but also to the type of claim (debt,
66. Lord Diplock in Moschi v. Lep Air Servs. Ltd. [1972] 2 All E.R. 393, 400.
67. This seems to be an approach recognized by many American textbook writers on the law
of tort, although some English authors are thinking this way now. See, e.g., H. STREET, STREET
ON TORTS (6th ed. 1972).
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damages, property) in issue. In this way the dialectical process between
property and obligations becomes more obvious, and thus the aim and
functions of particular areas of the law become more exposed. Ingram
v. Little is in one sense not 'about' mistakes in contract; it is about who
should have a particular car. The question that really needs to be con-
sidered is the function of the law of property in a consumer society,
rather than the determination of when there is a contractual obligation.
Failure to expose such issues precisely can cause trouble.68
But this essay is not meant as a plea for abolishing the distinction
between contract and tort. Indeed, there is much sense in distinguishing
the two; tort is about civil responsibility, while contract is about trans-
actions. However, the contract and tort dichotomy should be seen as a
signpost rather than a shackle; there are other remedies, as the Roman
jurists noticed, that cannot be adequately accommodated within the
two-fold classification. Thus when the Romans came to classify their
laws, they not only categorized the causes of action, but also the nature
of the claim; besides Property, Obligation, Persons, and Succession
there was also Actions. By emphasizing both the form of the action and
the substance of the claim, the Romans were able to coherently develop
defences such as the exceptio69 (not that dissimilar from our modem
estopple) and claims neither tortious nor contractual, such as unjust
enrichment. In America, of course, the concept of remedies is well
known7° and perhaps this is one reason why unjust enrichment has
gained acceptance. 7' In England, despite the efforts of Robert Goff and
Gareth Jones,72 the subject has still not been recognized by the House
of Lords.73
Of course, a reclassification of the common law will not in itself
solve the problems of legal categorization. It often only redefines the
issues. What a remedies approach could achieve, however, is an alter-
native viewpoint to the normal causes of action classification which at
the moment seems to dominate aspects of our jurisprudence. By em-
phasizing the form of the remedy as well as the cause of action, a legal
system is in a better position to adapt and develop: thus Lord Mansfield
68. See e.g. The House of Lords decision in Moorgate Mercantile Co. v. Twitchings [1976] 2
All E.R. 641, discussed by this author in, The Shifting Foundations of Duty ofCare 1977 LONDON L.
REv. 30, 35.
69. See F. SCHULZ, CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW (1951).
70. See, e.g., K. YORK & J. BAUMAN, REMEDIES (2d ed. 1967).
71. See, e.g., R. CHILDRES & W. JOHNSON, EQUITY, RESTITUTION AND DAMAGES(1974).
72. GOFF & JONES, supra note 58, at 1-11.
73. Orakpo v. Manson Invs. Ltd. [1977] 3 All E.R. 1, 7.
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in Moses v. Macferlan74 was not inventing a new remedy as such, he
was just pointing out that a debt- action might well be available outside
the promise situation. And Judge Denning in Central London Property
Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd"5 was not making an inroad into
the theory of consideration: he was just applying a different rem-
edy-that of equitable estopple-to contractual circumstances. Fur-
thermore, if this double perspective of law is always kept in mind, it
might be less difficult not only to distinguish restitution from tort,76 and
equity from contract, but also to appreciate the boundaries between
various torts. So, for example, the major difference now between negli-
gence and nuisance in English tort law "lies in the nature of the remedy
sought.""
Now that contract, it seems, is being rapidly destructured,78 it is
necessary to pay more regard to the 'deep structure' of the common
law. Hence an analysis that takes full account of legal history and the
nature of actions should help in highlighting perennial principles. So,
even if common lawyers do not know "what unlikely resurrection the
Eastertide may bring"7 9 with regard to contract as a cause of action, we
ought at least to be aware of how the common law operates at a more
formal level. In this way we might have some kind of map to guide us
through the contractscape in which we are now travelling.
74. [1760] 2 Burr. 1005; 97 Eng. Rep. 676.
75. [1947] 1 K.B. 130. See also KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 1, at 498.
76. See WEIR, Subrogation and Indemnity, supra note 50, which discusses the case of Morris
v. Ford Motor Co. [1973] 1 Q.B. 792; [1973] 2 All E.R. 1084.
77. Per Lord Denning M.R. in Miller v. Jackson [1977] 3 All E.R. 338, 343. His Lordship
continued: "If the plaintiff seeks a remedy in damages for injury done to him or his property, he
can lay his claim either in negligence or in nuisance. But, if he seeks an injunction... I think he
must make claim in nuisance."
78. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1976) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE]; Sa-
muel, Ideology and the Destructuring of Contract, 1976 LONDON L. REV. 29.
79. GILMORE, supra note 78, at 103.
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